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The Death Knell of Automatic
Standing-Another Blow to Fourth
Amendment Privacy
In two recent decisions,1 the Burger Court struck another blow
at the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable gov-
ernmental searches and seizures by further restricting a criminal
defendant's right to invoke the exclusionary rule. In United States
v. Salvucci,2 the Court overruled the "automatic" standing theory
of Jones v. United States and declared that if a defendant
charged with a crime of possession contests the validity of a search
and seizure, he must first show that he had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched. The inquiry is not whether the
defendant had "standing," but whether the state "in fact" violated
the defendant's fourth amendment rights.' In Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky,5 the 'Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of fourth
amendment protection by holding that a possessory interest in a
seized item does not necessarily evidence a legitimate expectation
of privacy." Possession of the seized goods, once a hallmark of
standing doctrine, is now only another factor to consider in estab-
lishing a legitimate privacy interest.7
A brief review of the development and demise of automatic
standing will highlight the import of the Salvucci and Rawlings
decisions. Although the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United
States8 was never as broad as its name suggests,9 it was the alter-
1. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct.
2547 (1980).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2547.
3. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Construing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), the Jones Court held that
the charge of criminal possession "automatically" gave the defendant standing to challenge
the legality of the search. In addition, the Court held that anyone legitimately on the
searched premises may challenge the search's legality when the state uses the fruits of the
search against him.
4. 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2551 n.4. The Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978), that "standing" is no longer the relevant inquiry "in determining whether a
defendant is entitled to claim the protections of the exclusionary rule." 100 S. Ct. at 2551
n.4. In Rakas, the Court asserted that the traditional standing requirements are "more
properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." 439 U.S. at 139.
5. 100 S. Ct. 2556.
6. The Court found adequate support in the record for the state court's conclusion that
the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in his companion's
purse and therefore could not challenge the validity of the search, even though he claimed
ownership of the seized drugs.
7. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261.
8. 362 U.S. at 257.
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native to a strict property-related theory of standing. 10 Before
Jones, a criminal defendant charged with possession of contraband
faced a Hobson's choice. To establish standing to contest the legal-
ity of a search and seizure, he had to show a possessory interest
either in the premises searched or in the goods seized." If he did
not own the premises and alleged ownership of the goods, he ad-
mitted his guilt. Although the prosecution could not lose, it was in
a contradictory position: it could allege that the defendant pos-
sessed the contraband for conviction purposes, but that he did not
have a sufficient possessory interest for standing purposes.
The defendant's self-incrimination dilemma and the prosecu-
tion's self-contradiction dilemma prompted the automatic standing
rule. No longer would a defendant charged with a crime of posses-
sion have to allege a property interest in the seized items (thus
incriminating himself) to establish standing. 2 Rather, the posses-
sory charge automatically clothed the defendant with standing to
contest the constitutionality of the search and seizure. Under the
Jones decision, automatic standing existed simultaneously with a
second standing theory announced in that case, that a defendant
legitimately on the searched premises has standing to contest the
legality of a search, and with traditional property concepts, as an
alternative route to standing.
Then in Katz v. United States,3 a substantive fourth amend-
ment decision, the Supreme Court redefined the nature of the in-
terests protected by the fourth amendment in terms of privacy.
Declaring that the fourth amendment protects people, not just
places, against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court
held that fourth amendment protection extends beyond property
lines to areas in which one reasonably expects freedom from gov-
ernmental intrusion. The defendant in Katz did not have to show
a physical trespass or a property right in the invaded place to es-
tablish a fourth amendment violation. The bugging of the phone
9. For example, the Court narrowed automatic standing in Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 229 (1973), to apply only when possession of the seized evidence at the time of the
contested search and seizure is an essential element of the offense charged.
10. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927) (expression of the view that
property interests are the focus of fourth amendment protection). But see Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
11. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (search and seizure violated the
fourth amendment rights of defendant who had a possessory interest in both the premises
searched and the property seized).
12. 362 U.S. at 264.
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 351.
[Vol. 35:360
DEATH KNELL OF AUTOMATIC STANDING
booth used by Katz "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied .. .and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."16
The Court's decision in Mancusi v. DeForte1 ' further reflects
the shift from property interests to privacy interests as the focus of
fourth amendment protection. In Mancusi, the Court applied the
principles of Katz to the issue of DeForte's standing to challenge
the government's seizure of records from a union office which De-
Forte shared with other officials. Like the defendant in Jones, De-
Forte did not have exclusive use of or access to the place searched,
nor did he have a personal property interest in the seized records.
Yet DeForte had standing, reasoned the Court, because he had a
reasonable expectation that the union office and records would be
free from governmental intrusion.7 Although standing no longer
turned on the defendant's possessory interests alone, property
rights in the seized goods could still confer standing. Therefore,
the Jones automatic standing rule remained necessary to prevent
the reoccurrence of the dilemmas that spawned Jones."'
Then, in Simmons v. United States,1 ' the Court called into
question the viability of the self-incrimination dilemma as a
rationale for automatic standing. In Simmons, the Court held that
testimony given by a defendant to establish standing cannot be
used against him at trial on the question of his guilt or innocence.' 0
The Court later recognized, in Brown v. United States,21 that after
Simmons "Itihe self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the
Jones decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpre-
tation of the Constitution."' 22 But the Brown Court expressly re-
served the question whether Simmons eliminated the need for the
15. Id. at 353.
16. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
17. Id. at 370.
18. But see Gutterman, A Person Aggrieved: Standing to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence in Transition, 23 EMORY L.J. 111, 126 (1974). Professor Gutterman argued force-
fully that possession of contraband should not by itself confer standing.
19. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
20. Id. at 394.
21. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
22. Id. at 228. In Brown, the government used stolen merchandise to convict defen-
dants charged with transporting and conspiring to transport stolen goods. The government
had seized the merchandise from the store of a co-conspirator while the defendants were in
police custody in another state. Because the indictment applied only to a period before the
search, the defendants could have claimed possession of the seized goods without admitting
their guilt of the offenses charged. Therefore, since these facts presented neither the
prosecutorial self-contradiction dilemma nor the defendant's self-incrimination dilemma,
the Court found the automatic standing rule inapplicable. Id. at 229.
1981]
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automatic standing rule for a case in which possession at the time
of the contested search and seizure "is an essential element of the
offense ...charged.''12 Although Simmons seemingly eliminated
the defendant's self-incrimination dilemma, it did not resolve the
prosecutorial dilemma. Thus, the Jones automatic standing rule
was still viable in the context of crimes of possession.
I Then, in the landmark decision of Rakas v. Illinois,24 the
Court established the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy
as the threshold inquiry in fourth amendment challenges to
searches and seizures.2 In Rakas, the police searched a getaway
car in which the defendants, who were charged with and later con-
victed of robbery, were passengers. The police found a shotgun
under the passenger seat and bullets in the glove compartment of
the car. The defendants did not claim ownership of either the car
or the seized goods. The Court held that the search had not vio-
lated the defendants' fourth amendment rights, because they did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched car.
Although the passengers were legitimately present, unlike the own-
er they did not have the right to contest the state's intrusion. The
Court overruled the "legitimate presence" theory of Jones and
confined the automatic standing portion of the Jones holding to its
facts.se Although the Court focused on the defendants' expectation
of privacy as the only appropriate criterion for determining stand-
ing,27 the references to property concepts in the opinion' s led some
commentators" and the dissenting Justices o to conclude that the
Court was actually returning to old property-related concepts of
standing. The thrust of Rakas, however, was to begin defining the
boundaries of legitimate expectations of privacy, subsuming prop-
erty concepts within those boundaries. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the plurality, noted that the right to exclude others from a
searched area was a prime indicator of legitimacy. 1 Justice Powell,
in his concurring opinion, pointed to the precautions taken by a
23. Id. at 228 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390).
24. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
25. See note 4 supra. In later decisions, several members of the Court criticized this
reading of Rakas. See, e.g., notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
26. 439 U.S. at 142-43, 147. Justices Powell and Burger concurred in "the distinction
between one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and one's expectation when in other
locations." 439 U.S. at 153-54 & n.2.
27. Id. at 143.
28. Id. at 143 n.12, 148.
29. 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653 (1979); 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 123 (1979).
30. 439 U.S. at 156 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Brennan, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
31. Id. at 143 n.12.
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defendant to maintain his privacy in a searched area, the nature of
a defendant's use of the area, and a defendant's rights in the seized
property as significant factors in the inquiry into whether a defen-
dant has a legitimate privacy interest in the searched area.32 De-
spite the Court's emphasis on privacy, the Court did not explicitly
dismiss possession as an alternative route to standing." Automatic
standing was still good law.
The facts of Rakas, however, had not given the Court the op-
portunity to rule on the vitality of automatic standing after Sim-
mons.3 4 United States v. Salvucci3 5 presented those facts. In that
case, the government charged the defendants, Zackular and
Salvucci, with twelve counts of unlawful possession of checks sto-
len from the United States mail. The police seized the stolen
checks during a search of Zackular's mother's apartment. Neither
defendant was present during the search. At the hearing on their
motion to supress, the defendants asserted that they had auto-
matic standing under Jones to challenge the validity of the search
warrant. The district court granted their motion and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that despite uncer-
tainty about the status of Jones, the Supreme Court had not yet
overturned that decision. 6 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari,37 overruled the automatic standing rule, and reversed and re-
manded to allow the defendants an opportunity to demonstrate a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched apartment."
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
decisions in Simmons and Rakas had eliminated the need for the
automatic standing rule to protect a defendant's fourth and fifth
amendment rights. The Court explained that since Rakas estab-
lished the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of privacy
as the threshold inquiry in fourth amendment challenges to
searches and seizures, it was no longer inconsistent for the prosecu-
tor to allege that a defendant accused of a crime of possession did
not have standing.8 9 In addition, even if the defendant alleged a
32. Id. at 150 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. In fact, the Court suggested that if defendants had asserted ownership or possession
of the seized goods, they might have had standing. Id. at 130 n.1, 148.
34. Id. at 135 n.4. The crime charged in Rakas was robbery, not illegal possession.
35. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
36. Id. at 2550.
37. The Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among the circuits on the status of
the automatic standing rule of Jones. Id. at 2250 n.2.
38. Id. at 2555.
39. Id. at 2552. Even after Rakas, the prosecutorial self-contradiction persists in crimes
19811
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possessory interest in the item seized to show his expectation of
privacy, under Simmons that testimony could not be used to es-
tablish his guilt at trial. 0 Although the Rakas and Simmons deci-
sions removed the two dilemmas underpinning the automatic
standing rule, they did not address the inequities that stem from
the government's use of a defendant's testimony at a suppression
hearing to impeach the defendant at trial. The Salvucci Court spe-
cifically declined to speak on the issue, although it did cite a num-
ber of lower court decisions that have held such testimony admissi-
ble, perhaps signalling the position the Court will take when and if
the issue comes before it.4 1 In an emphatic dissent, Justice Mar-
shall stressed that the potential admissibility of a defendant's tes-
timony for impeachment purposes remains a significant deterrent
to the defendant's exercise of his fourth and fifth amendment
rights.42 To the extent that the government may use the defend-
ant's testimony against him, even though not on the question of
his guilt, the self-incrimination dilemma underlying the automatic
standing rule persists.
4 8
With automatic standing overruled, criminal defendants
charged with possessory offenses must now bring forward evidence
that they have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched. How does a defendant persuade a court that his personal
expectation of privacy is indeed "legitimate"? The Court's decision
in Rawlings v. Kentucky" established that the defendant's posses-
sion of the item seized is not determinative. Rather, the answer
implicitly turns on the three factors enunciated by Justices Rehn-
quist and Powell in Rakas.4 5 Just before the police search in Rawl-
ings, the defendant stuffed a bag containing LSD and other con-
trolled substances into a companion's purse, while visiting at the
of constructive possession. Since to prove constructive possession the prosecution must
prove the ability to exclude others, the government cannot consistently charge the defen-
dant with constructive possession and simultaneously claim his fourth amendment rights
were not violated because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2554 & n.8.
42. Id. at 2555-56 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. The Salvucci dissenters also noted that the government can use the defendant's
suppression hearing testimony to develop its case and trial strategy. 100 S. Ct. at 2555.
44. 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
45. Those three factors are: the defendant's right to exclude others from the searched
area, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12; the defendant's use of the searched area, id. at 153 (Powell, J.,
concurring); the precautions taken by the defendant to maintain his privacy, id. at 152
(Powell, J., concurring).
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house of a mutual friend. He later asserted standing to contest the
legality of the search and seizure on the ground that he had a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in her purse. He did not, however,
show that he had a right to exclude others from her purse, or that
he had used her purse as a vehicle for his possessions before the
search.4 The state courts and the Supreme Court were not per-
suaded that Rawlings' precipitous behavior was consistent with an
inference that he took normal precautions to maintain his pri-
vacy.47 In fact, the defendant actually admitted that he had no
subjective expectation that the purse would remain free from gov-
ernmental intrusion.48 The Court found that these facts justified
the state court's conclusion that Rawlings did not have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his companion's purse.4
The dissenting Justices contended that the Court erroneously
narrowed the scope of fourth amendment protection to a privacy
interest in the area searched by rejecting the defendant's claim of
protection for his possessory interest in the property seized.50 The
fourth amendment, they noted, expressly protects against govern-
mental interference with one's "effects" as well as one's privacy.51
The dissent concluded that the state's seizure of the defendant's
property invaded the defendant's right to be secure in his effects
and gave the defendant the right to challenge the reasonableness
of that invasion.
The majority's conclusion in Rawlings that the defendant was
entitled to claim fourth amendment protection only if he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his companion's purse can be
explained in part by the Court's distinction between the nature of
the fourth amendment's protection of searches from its protection
of seizures.53 The Court implied that a defendant's possessory in-
terest in the item seized gives him standing only to contest the
legality of the seizure, not the search.5' If the defendant can show
46. 100 S. Ct. at 2561. There was conflicting evidence in the record about whether
Rawlings' companion gave him permission to put the bag of drugs in her purse. Id. at 2560
& n.1.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2561 & n.3.
49. Id. at 2562.
50. 100 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
51. Id. at 2568.
52. Id.
53. 100 S. Ct. at 2552. In Salvucci, the Court noted: "The person in legal possession of
a good seized during an illegal search and seizure has not necessarily been subject to a
Fourth Amendment deprivation." Id.
54. Id. at 2552 n.6. "Legal possession of the seized good may be sufficient in some cir-
19811
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that the search was illegal as to him by demonstrating that he had
a legitimate privacy interest in the area searched, he can then
claim that the seized evidence is the fruit of an illegal search and
that he is entitled to the benefit of the exclusionary rule. Other-
wise, a possessory interest in the item seized may give the defend-
ant standing to challenge the seizure only on much narrower
grounds-i.e., that the goods are not contraband, the product of
criminal activity, or evidence of a crime.55
The Rawlings dissent explicitly rejected this view: "If the de-
fendant's property was seized as the result of an unreasonable
search, the seizure cannot be other than unreasonable. ' 56 Objecting
to the majority's use of Rakas to justify limiting the scope of
fourth amendment protection, the dissent declared that Rakas
held only that being legitimately on the searched premises does
not necessarily entitle a defendant to such protection," and not
that the fourth amendment protects only a defendant's privacy in-
terest in the premises. 8
In Rakas, the dissenting Justices criticized the plurality opin-
ion for defining privacy interests in terms of property concepts,
thereby erroneously narrowing the scope of fourth amendment
protection.5 e In Rawlings and Salvucci, the Court further narrowed
that protection by eliminating a possessory interest in the item
seized as determinative of a protected privacy interest.6 0 The Court
did indeed turn "the development of the law of search and seizure
on its head."" By defining the fourth amendment's protection
cumstances to entitle a defendant to seek the return of the seized property if the seizure, as
opposed to the search, was illegal." Id. The Court did not address the issue further, how-
ever, because the defendants did not contest the validity of the seizure. Id.
55. See United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228, 230-31 (7th Cir. 1975), cited in Salvucci,
100 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6. In the court's denial of defendants' petition for rehearing, Judge
Stevens criticized the proposition that a defendant's interest in the seized property gives
him standing to challenge both the search and the subsequent seizure. 522 F.2d at 232-33.
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2568.
57. Id. at 2566.
58. Id.
59. 439 U.S. at 156-57 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissent-
ing) ("The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not people
60. In Rawlings, Justice Marshall's dissent criticized the Court for inconsistently claim-
ing that property rights do not by themselves trigger fourth amendment protection, and
then simultaneously defining the scope of the protected interest in terms of a property or
possessory interest. 100 S. Ct. at 2569.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 2568 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court has also turned "the stand-
ing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword
to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade one person's Fourth
Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person." United States v.
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solely in terms of legitimate privacy interests in the area searched,
and simultaneously excluding the privacy interests that arise from
certain property rights, the Court dismissed the intellectual history
of the fourth amendment" and opened the door to uncertain judi-
cial construction.
It is not clear what cumulative effect these decisions will have.
Through construction of the word "legitimate," courts can narrow
the fourth amendment's protection even further so that an individ-
ual will never be deemed to have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy if engaged in illegal activity, even in his own home." Or,
under the property-related standards of Rakas e4 courts may nar-
rowly construe a "legitimate privacy interest" to require a posses-
sory or property interest in the area searched. What is clear is that
the Court's discontent with the exclusionary rule has firmed its de-
termination to restrict access to the benefits of that rule by contin-
uing to limit the invasions forbidden by the fourth amendment.
DARLENE STOSIK
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2447-48 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Payner, the Court held
that the federal courts' supervisory power "does not authorize a federal court to suppress
otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court." Id. at 2446. See Baskes v. United States, petition for cert. filed,
49 U.S.L.W. 3578 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1066) (seeking reconsideration of United
States v. Payner).
62. The Rawlings dissent noted that Katz did not exclude property interests from
fourth amendment protection; rather, it recognized "that privacy interests are protected
even if they do not arise from property rights." 100 S. Ct. at 2568.
63. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12. "[Elven a property interest in premises may not be
sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items."
Id.
64. See note 45 supra.
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